Insurer Failing To Promptly Accept Tender Commits Bad Faith

The Washington Court of Appeals recently issued one of its most comprehensive analyses of the rights and obligations arising out of an insurer’s decision to defend under reservation of rights.
Ledcor Industries served as the general contractor for the erection of a condominium in Bellevue, Washington. When the condominium developer homeowners’ association filed suit against the complex’s developer alleging construction defect, the developer filed third party claims against Ledcor. Ledcor tendered the claims to its own insurance carriers, and those carriers accepted the tender and immediately appointed counsel for Ledcor’s defense.

Ledcor had required each of its subcontractors to name Ledcor as an additional insured in their CGL policies. Shortly after beginning Ledcor’s defense, Ledcor’s insurer-appointed attorneys tendered the claims to Ledcor’s subcontractors, including Zanetti Custom Exteriors (“Zanetti”). Zanetti, in turn, tendered to its insurer, Mutual of Enumclaw (“MOE”). Sometime thereafter, Ledcor also filed a fourth party complaint against Zanetti.

After a 14-month delay, MOE accepted Ledcor’s tender under reservation of rights. MOE offered to retain counsel or contribute to fees for attorneys already retained for Ledcor. However, thereafter MOE went silent, never appointing counsel and never requesting copies of attorney invoices. Despite notice to MOE of mediation and a reasonableness hearing, MOE did not participate in settlement efforts and did not appear at the reasonableness hearing. Eventually, Ledcor settled its fourth party claims with Zanetti for $236,000, which MOE, as Zanetti’s insurer, paid.
With the primary lawsuit resolved, Ledcor filed suit against MOE, asserting claims of breach of contract, bad faith, and violation of Washington’s Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”) based upon Ledcor’s failure to thoroughly investigate and promptly accept Ledcor’s tender. After a 3-day bench trial, the court found MOE breached its insurance policy and committed bad faith, awarding $101,873.02 plus prejudgment interest. The trial court also found that MOE’s practices were unfair and deceptive, but ultimately refused to award CPA damages, finding that no harm resulted from MOE’s unfair and deceptive conduct.

Both Ledcor and MOE appealed the trial court’s decision. MOE appealed the court’s finding that its conduct constituted bad faith. The Court of Appeals explained that an insurer defending under reservation of rights has an enhanced obligation to protect the insured by: (1) conducting a thorough investigation; (2) retaining counsel loyal only to the insured; (3) keeping the insured informed and apprised of progress in the lawsuit; and (4) refraining from placing its own interests ahead of the insured. The Court of Appeals found that MOE’s mere acceptance of the tender, some 14 months after the fact, failed to satisfy MOE’s heightened obligations to Ledcor. “The fact that Ledcor's other insurers were actively defending Ledcor's interests does not relieve MOE of its duties . . . to investigate and defend.”

Ledcor appealed the trial court’s failure to award bad faith damages, arguing that where bad faith is established, harm is presumed and the insurer is liable for “all . . . liabilities [incurred by the insured] regardless of cause.” The Court of Appeals acknowledged that a finding of bad faith results in a rebuttable presumption of harm. However, the remedy for bad faith is compensation for the harm caused by the insurer and estoppel as to the insurer’s policy defenses. In this case, because Ledcor had a full and adequate defense through its other insurers, and received $236,000 from MOE through Zanetti, Ledcor suffered no harm as a result of MOE’s bad faith. Contrary to Ledcor’s argument, the Court of Appeals held that the remedy of coverage by estoppel did not allow Ledcor to recover from MOE for harm caused by subcontractors other than Zanetti. Instead, coverage by estoppel simply prohibits the insurer from avoiding coverage under its own policy.

Ledcor also appealed the trial court’s finding on its CPA claims. The Court of Appeals began by reciting the five elements of a CPA claim: “(1) unfair or deceptive act or practice; (2) occurring in trade or commerce; (3) public interest impact; (4) injury to plaintiff in his or her business or property; and (5) causation.” The Court of Appeals found that once again, because Ledcor received an adequate defense through other insurers and ultimately recovered $236,000 from MOE through Zanetti, Ledcor suffered no harm as the result of MOE’s unfair and deceptive insurance practices. As a last ditch argument, Ledcor argued its injury was “loss of peace of mind and uncertainty” while awaiting MOE’s response and intervention. The Court of Appeals rejected the argument, declaring “emotional damages are not compensable under the CPA.”

Finally, Ledcor appealed the trial court’s refusal to award Olympic Steamship attorneys’ fees in its lawsuit against MOE. Under Olympic Steamship, an insured is entitled to recover attorneys fees where it is “compelled to litigate an issue of coverage” and prevails. Because MOE accepted coverage long before Ledcor filed suit against MOE, the Court of Appeals found MOE did not force litigation of coverage and, therefore, Ledcor was not entitled to attorneys fees.

Ledcor Industries, Inc. v. Mutual of Enumclaw, 2009 WL 1191783 (Wn. App. May 4, 2009). (.pdf)
 

No Coverage For Known Construction Defects Ignored By Developer

Far Northwest Dev. Co., LLC v. Cmty. Ass’n of Underwriters of Am., Inc. et al., 2009 WL 1099158 (W.D. Wash. April 22, 2009)

Faramarz Ghoddoussi, the sole member of Far Northwest Development, LLC (“LLC”) which built and sold the Somerset Village Townhome Condominiums, admitted that he was aware of construction defects in several condominium units during the construction process. However, Ghoddoussi did not share that information with unit owners or the homeowners’ association (“HOA”), and he did not undertake a full scale investigation of the complex to determine whether the same problems existed in other units. The HOA brought action against the LLC, and Ghoddoussi individually, alleging in part that Ghoddoussi breached his fiduciary duties to the HOA by failing to fully investigate the defects during development, and as a result the condominiums suffered physical damage.

Ghoddoussi and the LLC tendered to their insurers for defense and indemnity. After the insurers denied coverage and indemnity, Ghoddoussi and the LLC initiated a declaratory judgment action. The insurers filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that there could be no coverage or indemnity because the harms alleged in the underlying lawsuit were “expected or intended” by Ghoddoussi.

The insurance policy specifically excluded “‘property damage’ expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.” Furthermore, in granting the insurers’ motions for summary judgment, the court acknowledged that, even apart from the policy language, as a matter of insurance law “[t]here is never coverage where the harm is expected or intended.”

Ghoddoussi attempted to evade the exclusion by claiming that the damage was not “expected or intended” because he was unaware of any fiduciary duties and he lacked significant experience in construction. The court decisively rejected Ghoddoussi’s “self-serving testimony,” finding that the “expected or intended” exclusion negated any duty to defend or indemnify because Ghoddoussi was aware of the construction defects during the construction of the complex and, out of his own self-interest, failed to take action, thereby causing the damage.
 

Washington's Consumer Protection Act Applies to Insurers' Subrogation Collection Activities

Panag v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., et al., 204 P.3d 885 (April 2, 2009)

In consolidated appeals, the Washington Supreme Court evaluated the activities of a collection agency in its pursuit of subrogation claims. Both plaintiffs, Panag and Stephens, were involved in separate automobile accidents. The insurers for the other drivers, Farmers and Omni, provided their insureds with UIM benefits, then set about the business of subrogation. Both Farmers and Omni hired Credit Collection Services, Inc. (“CCS”) to obtain payment from Panag and Stephens, respectively, for the amounts the insurers had paid to their insureds.

CCS sent both Panag and Stephens a document entitled “FORMAL COLLECTION NOTICE,” setting forth the amounts paid by the insurers to their insureds as the “AMOUNT DUE.” In a series of increasingly threatening communications, CCS continued to pursue those sums, threatening litigation, license suspension, and various other costs. Panag and Stephens allegedly incurred significant costs in their efforts to contest the collection notices.

Panag and Stephens filed class action lawsuits against the insurers and CCS, alleging violation of Washington’s Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”), RCW 19.86 et seq. The traditional test for a CPA claim is known as the Hangman Ridge test, which requires the plaintiff to establish:
(1) an unfair/deceptive act or practice; (2) in trade or commerce; (3) affecting public interest; and (4) an injury to plaintiff’s business or property; (5) caused by that unfair or deceptive practice.

CCS argued that Panag and Stephens lacked standing, contending that a CPA claim could only arise in a business or consumer transaction, not in the context of collections where the parties are engaged in an adversarial relationship. The Washington Supreme Court rejected CCS’s contention, refusing to add a “sixth” element to the Hangman Ridge test. “A private CPA action may be brought by one who is not in a consumer or other business relationship with the actor against whom the suit is brought. . . . We conclude that the CPA is applicable to deceptive insurance subrogation activities.”